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ARGUMENT
To Address the arguments made by Defendants, this Court is called upon to first
determine whether shareholder agreements which are inconsistent with one or more of
the provisions of the former Utah Business Corporation Act or the current Utah Revised
Business Corporation Act are for that reason, necessarily void as against public policy.
Defendants ask the Court to concern itself with corporate inconvenience alleging
that the terms of the agreements make management decisions more difficult and remove
from directors their absolute and unequivocal management authority. The same concerns
could be raised if the shareholder agreements were written. Section 16-10a-732(l) is
broad and does not specify any limitation on the scope of that to which shareholders may
agree. Defendants must necessarily agree that Section 732 specifically authorizes
shareholder agreements having the same focus, purpose and terms as alleged by
Plaintiffs' Complaint and admitted for the purpose of this appeal. Therefore, Defendants
must further agree that the scope and terms of the agreements are fully authorized by
statute. If these agreements had been written and contained a written declaration that
they were to extend for a term in excess often years, they would have complied precisely
as the Defendants urge the Court to now require.
This Court has never determined that shareholder agreements, written or verbal,
are contrary to public policy. Therefore, unless now invalidated by public policy
concerns or by Section 732, the Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler shareholder agreements are
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valid and their scope and purpose is specifically acknowledged and approved if not
empowered by subsection 732(1).
A.

THIS COURT HAS NOT DETERMINED THAT SHAREHOLDER
AGREEMENTS INCONSISTENT WITH THE BUSINESS CORPORTION
ACT ARE FOR THAT REASON, INVALID UNDER UTAH LAW,
SECTION 732 DOES NOT VOID SUCH AGREEMENTS
Defendants, Ostler International and Ostler Property Development at all times

were closely held corporations. They were owned only by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler.
Pursuant to their verbal agreements, all policies and practices for the operation of
companies, including the conduct of the business of each company, was formulated and
implemented only and solely by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler and with consent of the
other. [R. 4, U 21]. Their agreement was one of mutual consent and persuasion. In other
words, they agreed to operate the companies and cause them to be managed relying on
that mutual consent.
There is no claim that the board of directors did not function or that the hiring and
retention of company management and employees was not undertaken pursuant to the
determination and direction of the board of directors. The two brothers worked together
pursuant to their agreement, to cause and assure that their business practices were
adopted and implemented by management. In other words, their agreement was to
influence if not direct decisions by the directors. Such was not unexpected, but necessary
where there were only two shareholders each owning an identical 50% of the shares.
There is nothing about these shareholder agreements or the circumstance of the
shareholder parties which would recommend let alone compel a determination that the
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agreements as a matter of law were invalid under traditional legal principals.
Notwithstanding, Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler claim that such principals invalidate the
agreements. Brief of Appellees Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 15. They give no Utah
precedent for their premise. Once again, the Official Commentary to Utah Revised
Business Corporation Act as adopted by the Utah Legislature acknowledges that modem
decisions reflect a greater willingness to uphold shareholder agreements. Official
Commentary, p. 338. Although this Court has not previously addressed the issue, other
jurisdictions have sustained shareholder agreements inconsistent with the applicable
business corporation act and even where the agreement declared the manner in which
corporate earnings were to be allocated among shareholders, established a veto over a
proposed corporation action or established policy for the corporation to follow in
conducting its business. See Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, Validity of
Stockholders' Agreement Allegedly Infringing on Directors' Management Powers - Modem Cases, 15 ALR 4th 1078, §§ 2[a], 4-6 (2005).
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 is the first and only Utah statute addressing
shareholder agreements as such. There has never been a statutory prohibition of such
agreements. Obviously, whether a particular shareholder agreement was enforceable
historically depended upon then traditional legal principals. The trial court ruling
construes Section 732 to be a Statute of Frauds. Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler correctly
recognize that it is not. Brief of Appellees, Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 17. They say
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that it only authorizes a contractual deviation from the statutory scheme. However, there
neither is nor has been a statutory scheme for shareholder agreements.
1.

SECTION 732 IS AMBIGUOUS.

Section 732(b) uses the term "shall" in addressing the conditions therein
enumerated. Defendants correctly recognize that such term is usually presumed to be
mandatory. However, the Section does not state that agreements not in compliance with
the enumerated conditions are for that reason void. It therefore is ambiguous and we look
to the Official Commentary declaring that such agreements are not invalidated by that
failure to comply.
Defendants cite to certain instances in which this Court has previously ruled with
regard to its interpretation of statutes. In none of those cases had the Utah Legislature
endorsed and directed the publication of an official commentary as an aid in the
understanding and interpretation of the statute. In the instant case, however, the
Legislature has done so evidencing its intention that its insight if not direction should be
considered with regard to the understanding and interpretation of Section 732. The
Official Commentary specifically declares that there should not be "a negative inference
that an agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories of
section 732(1) is, ipso facto, a type of agreement that is not valid unless it complies with
section 732". Official Commentary at 338. The Commentary further declares that
"[s]ection 732 minimizes the formal requirements for a shareholder agreement" and
"[t]he principal requirements are simply that the agreement be in writing and be approved
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or agreed to by all persons who are then shareholders". Id. at 339. Consequently, if
parties to a particular shareholder agreement seek Section 732 validation of the
agreement, then that validation is dependent upon compliance with Subsection 732(2).
However, if traditional legal principals will otherwise support the enforceability of the
agreement, then enforceability is not dependent upon the Section.
This Court, in Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, 100 P.3d 1171
reiterated its ruling in State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, 4 P.3d 795 as to the purpose it seeks to
achieve in statutory construction. The Court said:
Our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent,
as evidenced by the plain language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to
achieve.
Id. at Tf 11 (Emphasis added).
Section 732 clearly provides that agreements compliant with subsection (2) are
authorized by the Section. However, it does not declare what is to be the effect on
agreements long in existence, and partially performed by and with significant economic
impact to the parties. Consequently, there is raised the question of what purpose the
Legislature intended to accomplish with Section 732. The answer is given in the Official
Commentary recognizing the long existence of shareholder agreements relating to closely
held corporations and the need to provide recognition and enforceability to those
agreements. It is not declared that Section 732 is to bring immediate termination and
invalidity to agreements in existence at the date of the enactment of the statute and
irrespective of their duration, past performance and the economic impact to the parties.
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The inescapable legislative intent is to permit agreements falling within the framework*of
Subsection 732(2) to find automatic validation under the Section, but to permit other
shareholder agreements to be tested against traditional legal principals.
Ostler International and Ostler Property Development correctly acknowledge that
Section 732 does not specify a part performance exception. Brief of Appellees Ostler
International and Ostler Property Development at 17. Of course, there also is no specific
declaration that verbal agreements, by virtue of that fact, are void. Absent that
declaration of invalidity, there is not a need to specifically provide a part performance
exception. The Official Commentary sufficiently answers the questions as to why part
performance is not specifically addressed in the Section.
According to the Official Commentary, Section 732 was enacted in response to a
recognition, if not finding, that agreements among shareholders of closely held
corporations are commonplace and that there is justification for their recognition and
enforcement. It was enacted at a time when such agreements were finding approval by
the modern line of cases. The Official Commentary declares that Section 732 "is
intended to add, within the context of the traditional corporate structure, legal certainty to
shareholder agreements that embody various aspects of the business arrangement
established by the shareholders to meet their business and personal needs . . . . Thus,
Section 732 validates for nonpublic corporations various types of agreements among
shareholders even when the agreements are inconsistent with the statutory norms
contained in the Model Act and Revised Act". Official Commentary, p. 338. (Internal
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citation omitted), (emphasis added). In other words, the Section seeks to add legal
certainty to such agreements.
2.

UTAH LAW SHOULD ASSUME SHAREHOLDER
AGREEMENTS TO BE VALID.

There is no Utah precedent for the premise that an agreement between
shareholders, inconsistent with a provision of the Utah Revised Business Corporation Act
or of the former Utah Business Corporation Act, is based upon that fact alone, invalid and
unenforceable. There is no Utah precedent for the premise that such agreements violate
public policy. Consequently, such agreements are presumed enforceable unless and until
otherwise determined. See Phone Directories Co., Inc. v. Henderson, 2000 UT 64, ^ 15,
8 P.3d256.
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler argue that there cannot be a valid shareholder
agreement without specific statutory authorization. See Brief of Appellees Dale Ostler
and Vyron Ostler at 15. However, Section 732 does not create a first and original right in
shareholders to contract one with another, but rather recognizes that such agreements
regarding closely held corporations have long existed and that there is a need to facilitate
their enforcement.
Arguing that there is no such right absent strict compliance with Section 732(2),
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler refer to the formalities imposed by statute regarding the
execution of a decedent's last will and testament. Such is not a relevant analogy. The
Official Commentary recognizes the previous existence of agreements between
shareholders of closely held corporations. It neither finds nor declares that such
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agreements were or should have been invalid. In other words, there is neither an
aclmowledgement nor a declaration that such agreements are necessarily dependent upon
statutory authorization. Conversely, in order for a decedent's will to be valid, it must
comply with statutory requirements. A will is a unilateral declaration of the testator's
intentions regarding heirship and the management of the probate estate. It has no
efficacy until the testator's death. The testator thereafter has no ability to enforce the will
or to compel performance by his heirs of the matters on which he has conditioned their
receipt of the testate property.
The subject shareholder agreements are however, bilateral, providing rights and
imposing conditions of performance on the respective parties to the agreements.
Therefore and unless invalidated by Section 732, the agreements arose independent of
statute. They were mutually and reciprocally performed over a number of years with each
party expecting and receiving the benefit of the performance of the other party. Because
a decedent's will is a creature of statute and cannot exist in the absence of statutory
empowerment, the statute dictates the conditions of that empowerment and does not
declare as void an instrument which fails to comply. On the other hand, as declared by
the Official Commentary, the purpose of Section 732 "is intended to add,. . . legal
certainty to shareholder agreements that embody various aspects of the business
arrangement established by the shareholders to meet their business and personal needs."
Official Commentary, p. 338. If the agreements are written and additionally, if they
intend to continue for a term in excess of 10 years, and specifically therein so declare,
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then the agreements are thereby self proved by Section 732. However, if not so self
proved, then their validation and enforceability is dependent upon the application of
traditional legal principals.
B.

CORPORATE CONVENIENCE IS NOT AN ISSUE TO BE HERE
DETERMINED
Defendants argue as though they are attempting to contend against the

enforcement of oral agreements in general. Of course, such agreements are valid. "The
lack of a written agreement does not mean that there was no enforceable agreement."
Distort v. Enviropak Medical Products, Inc., 893 P.2d 1071, 1075 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995).
Defendants declare that the enforcement of the Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler shareholder
agreements will complicate management of these companies. Brief of Appellees Dale
Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 12; Brief of Appellees Ostler International and Ostler Property
Development at 26. However, the agreements, if written and in compliance with
subsection 732(2) would certainly have been enforceable. Defendants make no attempt
to identify any inconvenience, difficulty or burden with which the companies have dealt
in the past as a consequence of Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler operating under the verbal
shareholder agreements. Defendants do not tell us why and how any such complications
or inconvenience would have been avoided if the agreements had been written and
thereby validated by Section 732.
Obviously, the mutual rights and obligations to which Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler
agreed could have been reduced to writing without any limitation on their enforcement.
However the trial court held that the agreements were invalid, not because of some claim
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that they complicated management of the companies, but rather because they were verbal.
Had Gary Ostler's rights and obligations arisen under written agreement, the companies
and their management, would have been required to deal and respond in the same manner
as they now must do.
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler propose that this Court's decision should be based in
part on considerations of convenience to the companies. Brief of Appellees Dale Ostler
and Vyron Ostler at 37-41. No where, however, can they show that such considerations
motivated the enactment of Section 732. They contend that there are policy objectives
that are best served by the agreement of shareholders being reduced to writing. Again,
they neither show nor contend that such considerations were entertained by the Utah
Legislature with regard to its enactment of Section 732. Admittedly, it is easier to
determine the specific terms of an agreement if the same are written. Notwithstanding,
neither Section 732 nor the issues framed in this appeal are directed at corporate
convenience.
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler further argue that shareholders, by their agreement,
might attempt to cause a corporation to override conditions imposed by law. Brief of
Appellees Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler at 41. However, such ignores that such could be
the case irrespective of whether the shareholder agreements were written or verbal.
Section 732 declares that there are and can be shareholder agreements. The law
presumes agreements are intended to and will comply with the law, whether the
agreements be verbal or written. Although for any number of reasons a written as
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opposed to a verbal agreement is preferred irrespective of the agreements scope or
purpose, such is not here the issue. Rather, the questions are whether the Gary Ostler and
Dale Ostler verbal shareholder agreements were valid absent Section 732 and if so,
whether they are now invalidated by the Section.
C.

IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT SECTION 732 HAS APPLICATION WITH
REGARD TO ALL SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS EXISTING AT AND
AFTER ENACTMENTOF THE SECTION
The shareholder agreement regarding Ostler International was in place, operative

and being performed by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler for years prior to the enactment of
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732. Notwithstanding, upon enactment of the statute, the
agreement became subject thereto. Mr. Stowell does not suggest otherwise. However,
prior to Section 732, the agreement was valid and enforceable under Utah law and
remains so.
D.

THE MAINE AND CONNECTICUT COURT DECISIONS CITED BY
DEFENDANTS ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE
Defendants cite to the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine in Villar v. Kernan, 695

A.2d 1221 (Me. 1997). Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler further cite to the Appellate Court
of Connecticut in Fairfax Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 806 A.2d 535 (Conn. Ct. App. 2002).
The cases, although perhaps of interest with regard to the issues before this Court are
clearly distinguishable.
In Villar v. Kernan the Court addressed a section of the Maine Business
Corporation Act 13-A M.R.S.A. § 618, and ruled that the same prohibited the
enforcement of verbal shareholder agreements relating to the affairs of a corporation.
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The statute, although not the equivalent of Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 is materially
similar. It read in relevant part:
1. No written agreement, whether contained in the articles of incorporation or
bylaws or in a written side agreement, and which relates to any phase of the
affairs of the corporation,....

g . . . . shall be deemed invalid because the agreement contains any such provision,
or because it limits or restricts the powers of discretion of the directors of
the corporation,..., if the following conditions are satisfied:
A. . . . the agreement has been expressly assented to in writing by all
shareholders of the corporation, whether or not entitled to vote; and
B. Subsequent to the making of the agreement or its adoption in the articles
or bylaws, shares are transferred or issued only to persons who have
notice or actual knowledge thereof, or assent in writing thereto.
2. Notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the conditions set out in subsection 1,
paragraphs A and B, such an agreement shall be valid and enforceable
between the parties thereto, and their assignees and successors who have
notice thereof unless it is affirmatively shown that its enforcement would be
prejudicial to the rights of third parties who intervene in objection to its
enforcement.
(Emphasis added)
The Maine Court determined:
Although subsection (2) reflects an intent to allow enforcement of
shareholder agreements despite their failure to comply with the formalities
of subsection (1), the language of the subsection does not excuse the
writing requirements specified in the first sentence of that subsection.
Thus, only written agreements that fail to meet the requirements of
subsection (1) may be enforceable among the parties to the agreement by
virtue of subsection (2).
Villar, 695 A.2d at 1224. The Court observed by way of footnote that "[sjection 618 was
enacted at a time when shareholder agreements were viewed by courts as unenforceable
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infringements on traditional corporate structure and control." Id. at 1224. It appears the
court, despite the specific language of subsection (2), determined that the intention of the
legislature at the time of the enactment of the statute, years earlier, was that shareholder
agreements were to be unenforceable unless written.
It was in 1992 that Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732 was enacted. Then modern
case law authority was oftentimes validating and enforcing shareholder agreements.
Additionally, the Utah Legislature endorsed and directed the publication of the Official
Commentary. The Villar decision says nothing about any legislative commentary
endorsed and published as an aide in the understanding and interpretation of Section 618.
The Court, however, at footnote 3 of its decision, specifically contrasted its decision with
what is found in the Official Commentary to Section 732 that "the enumeration of these
types of agreements is not exclusive; nor should it give rise to a negative inference that an
agreement of a type that is or might be embraced by one of the categories . . . is ipso
facto, a type of agreement that is not valid unless it complies with [that] section. . . ."
Villar, 695 A.2d at 1224. The Villar Court, it appears, thereby suggests that if Section
732 was the statute which it was then called upon to interpret, and if the Official
Commentary to the section had been endorsed by the Maine Legislature, it may well have
determined the verbal shareholder agreement subject of its concern to have been valid
and enforceable.
In Fairfax Properties, Inc. v. Lyons, 806 A.2d 535 the Appellate Court of
Connecticut dealt with rather convoluted tactical procedures implemented by the parties
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in requesting the court to interpret and determine rights among corporate shareholders
arising under their written agreement and under a written corporate resolution
incorporating the terms of the agreement. Determining that both the agreement and the
resolution were valid, the court cited to Connecticut General Statutes § 33-717. The
Statute is not identical to Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732(2) but is materially similar.
However, the court did not declare that the subject agreements being written rather than
verbal was material to its decision. The question was never raised. The court did not
declare that the agreement and the resolution would have been invalid if not written. The
court did not refer to any legislative commentary nor declare whether such existed. The
court's decision is not relevant to the issues before this Court nor helpful to its ultimate
decision.
E.

THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS DID NOT EXPIRE AS A
CONSEQUENCE OF THE TIME LIMITATION PROVIDED IN
SUBSECTION 732(2)
Once again, those shareholder agreements for which the parties seek validation

under Section 732, rather than upon traditional legal principals, must comply with all of
the requirements of Subsection 732(2). One such requirement is that the agreement is
limited to a term of only ten years, unless it provides otherwise. Utah Code Ann. § 1610a-732(2).
Mr. Stowell's Complaint does not allege a specific term for these shareholder
agreements. The agreements were to assure Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler that their
respective shares and ownership interests in the two companies would enjoy the
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protection of being held and enjoyed with a requirement of mutual agreement regarding
the business policies and decisions which would determine the value of that ownership.
Obviously, it was their intention and design to preserve and protect that value for as long
as that ownership interest was held by they and the objects of their bounty. The
agreements would come to an end upon the termination and winding up of the
companies. Prior to that time, those who hold that ownership interest are entitled to the
rights and protection which Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler intended and to which they
agreed.
Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler were inarguably mortal with no assurance as to
whether either or both would survive the completion of their business enterprise. This
Court may take judicial notice of their individual expectation that this and other interests
owned at their death would pass to their designated heirs.
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler cite to Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Russell, 966 P.2d .
852 (Utah 1998) wherein this court addressed a written agreement providing for an
option to purchase certain real property. The trial court had held the agreement was
unenforceable in part because it violated the common law rule against perpetuities.1 This
Court, in holding that the rule against perpetuities did not void the agreement, said:
In an attempt to give effect to the intent of the parties, the settled rule is that if a
contract fails to specify a time of performance the law implies that it shall be done
within a reasonable time under the circumstances. . . . An implied reasonable time
limit is as much a part of the agreement as those terms that are expressed.
Coulter & Smith, Ltd., 966 P.2d at 858. (Internal citations omitted)
1

Utah Code Ann. Section 75-2-1208, effective July 1, 1998, provides that the common law rule against
perpetuities does not apply in Utah.
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Ostler International and Ostler Property Development argue that contracts that do
not specify a duration are generally presumed to be terminable at will. Brief of Appellees
Ostler International and Ostler Property Development at 22. Attempting to support that
premise, they cite Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, f 21, 54 P.3d
1165. The case is not on point. There, this Court was interpreting an employment
agreement and was focusing on its determination that the agreement was an at-will
agreement. Specifically, this Court said "courts in Utah and elsewhere adopted the atwill employment rule, under which employment contracts that did not specify a duration
were generally presumed to be terminable at will." Id. at ^f 21. These shareholder
agreements are not employment contracts. There is no allegation and therefore, no
factual admission that the parties had agreed that those agreements were to terminate at
the will of either party.
Considering the purposes of their agreements, Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler
necessarily intended and agreed that the shareholder agreements would remain in place
for so long as their shares in the companies were owned by them and by the objects of
their bounty. Perhaps we should ask whether Dale Ostler's opposition to the enforcement
of the shareholder agreements would have been raised by his probate estate and heirs in
the event that he had predeceased his brother.
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F.

THE SHAREHOLDER AGREEMENTS ARE NOT PERSONAL SERVICE
CONTRACTS
Dale Ostler and Vyron Ostler seek to show that the shareholder agreements are

personal services contracts and that Gary Ostler's rights thereunder are not transferable to
his personal representative and the heirs of his probate estate. Mr. Stowell's Complaint
does not allege that Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler agreed to provide any particular service
or management skill or for that matter to undertake responsibility for any particular
performance with regard to the companies. Consequently, the admitted fact is that they
did not so agree. The 50% interest which each held in the companies imposed a joint
right to be persuaded by the other with regard to the general business practices and
purposes of the companies.
Ostler International and Ostler Property Development seek to construe these
shareholder agreements as though they were agreements between general partners. Brief
of Appellees Ostler International and Ostler Property Development at 25-26. However,
Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler were not partners. They were the sole shareholders of these
companies. Their shareholder agreements were directed at their shares of capital stock.
The terms of their agreements fall within the contemplation and parameters of Utah Code
Ann. § 16-10a-732(l). If the agreements had been written they would have been
validated by the Section. The agreements most certainly are not governed by partnership
law.
The shareholder agreements did not require either Gary or Dale Ostler to be
personally involved in the day to day management of the companies, but rather to
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mutually determine and to agree upon those who would undertake and perform that
management. Mr. Stowell is the Personal Representative of the Gary Ostler probate
estate. He neither claims nor is required to have any particular expertise with regard to
the management or business of the companies. He has a contractual right to be informed
sufficient to make an informed decision to either consent to or oppose a particular
business or management practice. He has the right to be persuaded. He has the right to
object or consent.
It should be noted that upon Dale Ostler's death, his rights under the agreements
necessarily will be exercised by his designated personal representative or trustee and
eventually, the heirs of his probate estate or beneficiaries of any trust. Such
representative, heirs and beneficiaries will not be expected to possess or to provide any
particular expertise or experience relative to the business of the companies.
Notwithstanding, if the probate of the Gary Ostler estate is then ongoing, Mr. Stowell and
the heirs of the Gary Ostler estate and the personal representative or trustee and heirs or
beneficiaries of Dale Ostler will then be called upon to recognize and utilize the same
reciprocal rights of consent and persuasion regarding the business and operation of the
companies.
CONCLUSION
The Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler shareholder agreements, although inconsistent
with a portion of the Utah Business Corporation Act and now the Utah Revised Business
Corporation Act, neither were nor now are invalidated, by reasons of that inconsistency.
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They have been partially performed by Gary Ostler and Dale Ostler and are valid and
enforceable based upon traditional legal principals. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-732
recognizes the existence of such agreements and does not invalidate them. Whether
shareholder agreements and particularly those which are not written constitute an
inconvenience to the corporate management is not an issue before the Court. These
shareholder agreements did not expire as a consequence of the time limitation provided in
Subsection 732(2) and neither were nor are personal service contracts. As a
consequence, Gary Ostler's rights and obligations under these shareholder agreements are
now held by Douglas L. Stowell as Personal Representative of his probate estate.
DATED this jf?

day of December, 2005.
NIELSEN & SENIOR

A. W^ton'
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Dougras L. Stowell, Personal
Representative of the Estate of
Gary W. Ostler, Deceased
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